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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND BEACH ACCESS:
COMPARING NEW JERSEY TO NEARBY STATES
Jack Potash*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public trust doctrine, which has its roots in Roman law and
English common law, establishes that tidal waters and certain other
navigable waterways, along with the tidal lands underlying those
waters, are held in trust by the states for the benefit, use, and
enjoyment of the public.1 Specifically, the public trust doctrine as
employed by most of the seven states2 surveyed in this Comment
provides—with some exceptions—that the state owns all lands seaward
of the mean high tide line in trust for the public, including the
“foreshore,” which is defined as the area of beach sand situated
between the mean high and low tide lines.3 Along with its decree of
public ownership, the doctrine has historically protected the public’s
right to navigate by boat and to fish upon public trust lands.4 Each
state’s public trust doctrine differs as to the degree of rights afforded
to the public; there is a federal public trust doctrine, but it is
considered “a default minimum standard,” and states “almost always
expand” upon it.5 As such, this Comment is concerned exclusively with

*J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude,
2013, New York University. I would like to thank Professor Angela C. Carmella for all
of her help and guidance as well as my classmates on the Seton Hall Law Review for
their editing assistance.
1
See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 119 (N.J.
2005) (explaining the historical development of the public trust doctrine).
2
New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Massachusetts.
3
See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 359–60
(Mass. 1979) (explaining that the English common law established public ownership
seaward from the mean high tide line, but that Massachusetts deviated from this
standard by using the mean low tide line for public ownership instead). For a detailed
discussion of the differences between the states’ individual public trust doctrines, see
infra Parts II, III & IV.
4
See Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
5
Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
4–5 (2007).
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the public trust doctrines of the seven individual states surveyed
herein, each of which originated prior to the federal doctrine.6
In particular, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has advanced a
dynamic and highly functional version of the public trust doctrine,
which guarantees that members of the public have both reasonable
“vertical” access—meaning access through upland areas—to the
publicly owned foreshore and reasonable “horizontal” access—
meaning access along the waterfront, parallel to the foreshore—to the
dry sand above the foreshore of Atlantic Ocean-facing beaches.7 The
New Jersey doctrine applies not only to publicly and quasi-publicly
owned upland areas, but also to some locations where the sand above
the foreshore is privately owned.8 New Jersey courts apply several
factors in order to determine the extent of the public’s right to cross
and/or use portions of privately owned, oceanfront beaches, balancing
private rights and public trust rights in the process.9 In addition, the
New Jersey version of the doctrine explicitly protects the public’s right
to take part in recreational activities on public trust lands, including
swimming in the ocean and resting on the shore, recognizing that
fishing and navigation are no longer the only uses that the doctrine
contemplates on such lands.10
New Jersey is unusual, however, among coastal states in the MidAtlantic and Northeast in terms of the degree of access it affords to its
beaches under the public trust doctrine. In Maryland, though the state
owns tidal lands up to the mean high tide line, the public has no right
to access or cross privately owned upland sand areas in order to reach
the public foreshore.11 In Delaware, the state only owns tidal lands up
to the mean low tide line, and the Superior Court of Delaware has
specifically rejected an invitation to adopt the New Jersey version of the
doctrine, deeming it to be too expansive and inconsistent with
Delaware’s existing doctrine.12 New York courts have seen scant
litigation on the matter and have not established any public rights
beyond public ownership seaward of the mean high tide line.13
6
7

See infra Parts II & III.
See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J.

2005).
8

See id.
See id. at 121–22.
10
See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–
55 (N.J. 1972).
11
See Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464, 473–74 (Md. 2012).
12
See Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003,
1994 WL 89804, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994).
13
See Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970),
9
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Connecticut’s high court has explicitly rejected the claim that the
public has any right to cross upland beach areas to reach the foreshore,
which is publicly owned.14 Rhode Island has a similar doctrine, under
which the public owns the foreshore below the mean high tide line but
has no right to access dry sand areas above that line.15 Finally, in
Massachusetts, private landowners own land down to the mean low tide
line.16 While Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine allows for public
usage up to the mean high tide line—covering the entire foreshore—
for fishing, foaling, and navigation, it does not provide for
“perpendicular” access, which is the same as “vertical” access in New
Jersey, across upland areas to the foreshore.17
As a result, the public trust doctrine is severely limited in other
coastal states in the vicinity of New Jersey. In these states, the public
trust doctrine only guarantees public access to a small—and sometimes
completely submerged, such as during a normal high tide—strip of the
beach and does not include any right of vertical public access from
upland areas.18 The purpose of the public trust doctrine—public
ownership of tidal lands—strongly suggests that the New Jersey model
is preferable to those of nearby coastal states. Unlike the public trust
doctrines of the other states surveyed in this Comment, the New Jersey
doctrine allows for meaningful, substantial public access to the shore.19
Part II of this Comment provides significant detail as to both the
historical development and the modern state of the public trust
doctrine in New Jersey as it pertains to beach access, outlining the types
and degrees of access permitted under the current doctrine. Part III
of this Comment then provides significant detail as to the historical
development and modern conditions of the various versions of the
public trust doctrine espoused by the other six states surveyed herein.
Part IV of this Comment presents an argument in favor of the more
robust New Jersey version of the public trust doctrine, as compared to
the versions utilized by the other six states. This part considers
examples from case law to determine how public trust rights function,
in practice, in New Jersey and in the other six states. Finally, Part V
modified, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
14
See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001).
15
See Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC 91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at
*7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997).
16
See Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
17
See id.
18
See supra discussion Part I.
19
See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363–64, (N.J.
1984) (noting that public ownership of the foreshore “would be meaningless” without
a means of guaranteeing public access to said foreshore).
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concludes by reiterating that the New Jersey version of the public trust
doctrine best fulfills the purposes of the doctrine among the seven
states surveyed.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND BEACH ACCESS IN NEW JERSEY
The public trust doctrine has a strong foundation in New Jersey,
extending back to the colonial era. The doctrine has its earliest origins
in Roman jurisprudence, which kept access to the shoreline open to
all persons.20 This principle carried into English common law, finding
a direct expression in the Magna Carta.21 The modern New Jersey
public trust doctrine is derived directly from the English common law
doctrine, which established that the sovereign owned the lands
covered by tidal waters for the common use of the people.22 The
existence of the public trust doctrine has never been in doubt in New
Jersey.23 In fact, the first case to explicitly mention the doctrine was the
1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy.24 In that case, the court found that the
sea and the fish therein, among other natural resources, constituted
common property that the English sovereign had previously held and
that the state government subsequently held for the people of New
Jersey after the Revolution.25 The court also noted that the state could
not convey tidal lands to private holders because doing so would divest
the people of their common right to that land.26
New Jersey’s modern public trust doctrine features three seminal
decisions by the state’s high court—Borough of Neptune City v. Borough
of Avon-by-the-Sea,27 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,28 and Raleigh
Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.29—each of which has
subsequently added to and fortified the rights and protections
afforded to the public under the doctrine. The first is Neptune City, a
1972 decision in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey sought to
clarify the public trust doctrine after noting that the doctrine, though

20

Id. at 360.
Id. at 360–61 (explaining that the Magna Carta “rectified . . . prior improper
conduct” by William the Conqueror of appropriating common property).
22
See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51
(N.J. 1972).
23
Id. at 52.
24
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
28
471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
29
879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
21
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clearly a part of New Jersey law, was not well-defined.30 The court had
to determine whether Avon-by-the-Sea, a coastal municipality, could
charge higher beach access fees to non-residents than to residents.31
The court noted that Avon had once held its beach “free to all comers,”
along with the rest of the New Jersey shoreline, but that the rise of
automobile usage had led to a substantial increase in the number of
beach-goers, resulting in crowded beaches and the implementation of
beach access fees by Avon and other municipalities.32 After briefly
discussing the historical basis of the public trust doctrine and noting
that the scope of New Jersey’s public trust doctrine was poorly-defined,
the court proceeded to stress both the vast importance of the shoreline
to the state and the tremendous increase in the recreational use of the
shore resulting from improvements in transportation and increases in
population.33 The court reiterated New Jersey precedent, noting that
the state owns all tidal lands up to the mean high tide line and
clarifying that there was no issue of access to the foreshore in this case,
as Avon publically owned the upland sand area above the foreshore.34
Thus, the only issue was whether Avon could discriminate between
residents and non-residents in charging access fees.35
In a significant step, the Neptune City court resolved the dispute of
differentiated beach access fees by expanding the rights guaranteed to
the public under the public trust doctrine in two key ways: first, by
determining that the public has full access rights under the doctrine
to publicly owned upland dry sand areas in addition to the publicly
owned foreshore and, second, by finding that the doctrine protects
modern recreational beach uses. Specifically, the court found that the
public trust doctrine, as a principle of common law, is flexible and
“should not be considered fixed or static.”36 As such, the court held
that, when a beach—including “the upland sand area” of the beach
above the foreshore, to use the court’s own term—is publicly owned,
30

Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 53 (“It is safe to say, however, that the scope and
limitations of the doctrine in this state have never been defined with any great degree
of precision.”).
31
Id. at 48–49.
32
Id. at 49. Beach access fees help municipalities pay for beach maintenance and
operating expenses (such as lifeguards’ wages). See id. Municipalities were explicitly
granted the authority to charge beach access fees in two New Jersey statutes, enacted
in 1950 and 1955. Id. at 50. Avon amended its own ordinance in 1970 to charge higher
beach access fees to non-residents than to residents, leading to this litigation. Id. at
50–51.
33
Id. at 53.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 53–54.
36
Neptune City, 294 A.2d at 54.
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“a modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine
dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on
equal terms and without preference.”37 As to what activities the public
has a right to conduct on publicly owned beaches—including upland
dry sand areas—the court held that the public trust doctrine protects
more than just the public’s right to “the ancient prerogatives of
navigation and fishing.”38 Instead, the court found that a modern,
dynamic public trust doctrine must also protect modern recreational
uses, which include “bathing, swimming and other shore activities,” in
order to be effective.39 According to the court, as a result of such an
expanded public trust doctrine, towns cannot be permitted to
discriminate against non-residents in charging beach access fees.40
Towns can charge fees, but they must charge residents and nonresidents the same amount, as to do otherwise would violate the
public’s access rights under the doctrine.41
The second seminal case of New Jersey’s modern public trust
doctrine is Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, the first major case
in the state to deal with public access to quasi-publicly owned and
privately owned upland sand areas above the mean high tide line.42
Matthews involved the beaches of Bay Head, which contained seventysix beachfront properties at the time of the litigation.43 The Bay Head
Improvement Association (the “Improvement Association”), an agency
that controlled beach access in the town and limited such access to
Improvement Association members, directly owned six of those
properties.44 Private landowners owned the remaining seventy
properties; however, most of the landowners leased their dry sand
areas to the Improvement Association, such that it had full reign to
regulate access to those properties as well.45 As of the date of the
Matthews decision, there had never been any attempt by the
Improvement Association or by anyone else to stop any person,
37

Id. at 54.
Id.
39
Id. The court noted that other states have similarly expanded the scope of the
public trust doctrine beyond its original purposes to cover recreational uses, including
Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon, California, and New York. Id. at 55.
40
Id. at 55.
41
Id. (“We are convinced it has to follow that, while municipalities may validly
charge reasonable fees for the use of their beaches, they may not discriminate in any
respect between their residents and nonresidents.”).
42
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984).
43
Id. at 359–60.
44
Id.
45
Id. The Improvement Association employed beach police to ensure that only
members could access the beach. Id. at 359.
38
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Improvement Association member or not, from accessing the area
below the mean high tide line—the publicly owned foreshore.46
Specifically at issue was whether the non-Improvement Association
public had the right to also access the dry sand area of the beach
upland of the foreshore, for vertical access through it as a direct route
to the foreshore and/or for horizontal access along it as a more
expansive right to remain on the upland sand area.47
The court first found that, in order to accommodate the
expanded rights of public access to dry sand areas and recreational
uses that had been established in the Neptune City decision twelve years
earlier, public access to “municipally-owned dry sand areas,” in
addition to access to the foreshore, is of vital importance.48 The court
also noted, however, that neither Neptune City nor any subsequent case
had addressed the question of access to and across dry sand areas above
the foreshore of privately owned beaches.49 In a significant step, the
court determined that the public’s right to use the foreshore “would
be meaningless” if the public had no way to access said foreshore.50 In
perhaps an even more significant step, the court proceeded to find
that the public must be granted at least some access to the dry sand
areas above the foreshore, not only for purposes of accessing the
foreshore, but also because the foreshore and the sea itself cannot be
reasonably enjoyed without at least some ability to rest upon the dry
sand.51
After recognizing the practical necessities of public access to dry
sand areas above the foreshore, the court determined that public
46

Id. at 359–60. Access to the Bay Head foreshore could have been gained by nonImprovement Association members by entering Bay Head along the foreshore from
the Borough of Mantoloking to the south or from the Borough of Point Pleasant to
the north. Id. at 360.
47
Id. at 358. The court described the Improvement Association as a “quasi-public
body,” and conducted its analysis under the public trust doctrine based on the
distinction between land controlled by such a body and land controlled directly by a
municipality, like the land at issue in Neptune City. Id.
48
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 362–63.
49
Id. at 363–64. In particular, the Matthews court noted that such access can be
divided into two types: (1) the public’s right to cross dry sand areas to reach the
foreshore (vertical access), and (2) the public’s right to remain upon dry sand areas
for sunbathing and recreational activities (horizontal access). Id.
50
Id. at 364. That said, the court recognized that the public certainly does not
have an unlimited right to cross privately owned lands in order to reach the foreshore.
See id. Instead, “[t]he public interest is satisfied so long as there is reasonable access to
the sea.” Id. (emphasis added).
51
Id. at 365. The court noted that, without any ability to access the dry sand area
above the foreshore, it may be impossible for a person to rest on the shore after
swimming in the ocean. Id.
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rights to dry sand areas under the public trust doctrine should not be
limited to municipally owned beaches of the type at issue in Neptune
City.52 Instead, “where use of dry sand is essential or reasonably
necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the doctrine warrants the
public’s use of the upland dry sand area subject to an accommodation
of the interests of the owner.”53 In so holding, the court cited “the
increasing demand for our State’s beaches and the dynamic nature of
the public trust doctrine,” leading it to conclude that the public must
have a right to both access and use “privately-owned dry sand areas as
reasonably necessary.”54
The court identified four factors for determining the exact nature
and extent of the public’s rights to any individual piece of privately
owned dry sand area, noting that specific factual circumstances will
determine how much, if any, access is required; public access to such
areas under Matthews is, therefore, determined on a case-by-case basis.55
Specifically, the four Matthews factors are: “[l]ocation of the dry sand
area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability of publiclyowned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public demand, and
usage of the upland sand land by the owner.”56 In applying its
reasoning—and the factors it developed—to the facts of this case, the
Matthews court ultimately found that, by excluding the public from the
dry sand beaches of Bay Head above the foreshore, the Improvement
Association frustrated the public’s rights under the doctrine.57 Thus,
the court determined that the public trust doctrine required
Improvement Association membership to be open not just to residents
of Bay Head, but also to the public at large—guaranteeing that
members of the public could elect to gain both vertical and horizontal
access to the dry sand areas of Bay Head’s beaches by securing
membership in the Improvement Association.58
52

Id.
Id.
54
Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
55
See id. at 365–66.
56
Id. at 365.
57
Id. at 368. Specifically, the court found that Bay Head contained no public
beaches. Id. It also noted that if every municipality on the shore chose to implement
such a policy, the public would not be able to exercise its right to use and enjoy the
foreshore at all. Id. For a more detailed, factor-by-factor analysis of the court’s
application of the Matthews factors to a privately owned beach in the more recent
Raleigh Avenue case, see infra discussion Part II.
58
Id. at 368–69. The court recognized that Improvement Association membership
confers rights that go beyond the scope of the public trust doctrine, but held that
opening up membership to the public is still required in order to effectuate the
doctrine (full membership may go beyond the rights of the doctrine, but no
53
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The third and final major New Jersey decision on the public trust
doctrine and beach access—in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey
applied the principles of Neptune City and Matthews directly to a piece
of privately owned land, in a statement of law that now defines the
modern New Jersey doctrine—is the 2005 decision of Raleigh Avenue
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.59 In Raleigh Avenue, the court
directly applied the Matthews factors to a privately owned beachfront
property and found that the public trust doctrine required public
access to its upland sand areas via both vertical access—from a street
on dry land, across a dune and dry sand, to the foreshore—and
horizontal access—along the length of the beach and parallel to the
ocean, inland from the foreshore.60
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. (“Atlantis”) owned a beachfront lot,
including an area of sand dunes and a large upland sand area landward
of the mean high tide line, in Lower Township, New Jersey.61
Specifically, Atlantis was located in a section of Lower Township known
as Diamond Beach, a small area that contained the only Atlantic
Ocean-facing beach in the town and had, at the time of the case, only
a few places from which the public could access the beach.62 Atlantis
opened its private beach club in 1996, after which it began charging
non-member residents of Diamond Beach substantial fees for the right
to limited access to its beach.63 On June 22, 2002, Tony Labrosciano, a
Raleigh Avenue resident and a member of the Raleigh Avenue Beach
Association (“the Beach Association”), was issued a trespassing
summons when he attempted to walk from the wet sand area of the
beach to the east of the mean high tide line—the foreshore—through
the dry sand area owned by Atlantis in order to reach his Raleigh
Avenue home.64 Subsequently, the Beach Association filed a complaint
against Atlantis, among other defendants, claiming that Atlantis’ beach
access policy violated the public trust doctrine.65

membership falls short of the doctrine’s guaranteed rights). Id.
59
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
60
See id. at 124.
61
Id. at 113–14. Atlantis operated its property “as a private club.” Id. at 113.
62
Id. at 115. Atlantis was located at the end of Raleigh Avenue, which was one of
only three public beach access points in Diamond Beach. Id. The closest free beach
access point to Raleigh Avenue was Dune Drive, nine blocks (approximately one half
mile) from Raleigh Avenue. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 116. Raleigh Avenue residents made up the Raleigh Avenue Beach
Association. Id.
65
Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 116.
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The trial court below considered issues of both horizontal and
vertical access to Atlantis’ dry sand area under the public trust doctrine
and found that: (1) as to horizontal access, the public was only entitled
to use the area below the mean high tide line and a three-foot-wide
strip of dry sand immediately landward of that line; and (2) as to
vertical access, the public was only entitled to use a narrow pathway
along the northern edge of the Atlantis property to reach the
foreshore from Raleigh Avenue.66 The Appellate Division below issued
an opinion recognizing greater public trust rights than the trial court
had found, determining that Atlantis could not interfere with the
public’s right to either vertical or horizontal access to the dry sand area
under the public trust doctrine.67 At oral argument before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Atlantis conceded vertical access to the
foreshore to the Beach Association along a narrow boardwalk
extending from Raleigh Avenue to the ocean, but maintained its
position that horizontal access should be limited to a three-foot-wide
strip of dry sand immediately above the foreshore.68
Significantly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reiterated the
message of the Matthews court that the public trust doctrine would be
without meaning or force if access to public trust lands, i.e., the
foreshore, were unavailable.69 In acknowledging this fact, the court
found a modern parallel to the Roman origins of the public trust
doctrine.70 Under the ancient doctrine, people were able to haul their
fishing nets ashore and dry them on the sand, an activity that would
have required the use of much more than just the usually wet—and
sometimes completely submerged—foreshore.71 The court then
66

Id. at 117. Both the Beach Association and the State, which had been named as
a defendant, appealed the trial court’s determination. Id.
67
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 851 A.2d 19, 22, 33 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), aff’d, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). In particular, the Appellate
Division found that the public trust doctrine included a right of the public to use and
to remain upon the dry sand area above the foreshore. Id. at 22. It also found that
Atlantis could charge fees to members of the public for use of the dry sand area if they
remained in that area for extended periods of time, provided that Atlantis supplied
certain services (trash pickup on the beach, lifeguards, showers, etc.) and that such
fees were approved by the state Department of Environmental Protection. Id. Atlantis
subsequently petitioned to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for review. Raleigh Ave.,
879 A.2d at 118.
68
Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 119. Atlantis essentially argued for the solution
reached by the trial court. Id.
69
Id. at 120.
70
See id.
71
See id. (“[U]se of the dry sand has long been a correlate to use of the ocean and
is a component part of the rights associated with the public trust doctrine.”). The link
made by the court to the Roman roots of the public trust doctrine is of great
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turned to the Matthews factors and applied them directly to determine
the nature and extent of public trust rights, if any, to the dry sand area
owned by Atlantis.
As to the first Matthews factor, “[l]ocation of the dry sand area in
relation to the foreshore,” the court noted that the three-foot strip of
dry sand immediately landward of the foreshore, to which Atlantis
wished to restrict the public’s horizontal access, was about 339 feet
seaward from the dune line in front of Raleigh Avenue.72 As to the
second factor, “[e]xtent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand
area,” the court noted that there was no publicly owned beach in Lower
Township; an adjacent municipality did have public beaches, but the
only option in Lower Township was to pay for access to privately owned
beaches.73 As to the third factor, “[n]ature and extent of the public
demand,” the court found that, while the Diamond Beach section of
Lower Township was small and had limited parking, the overall
demand for beach use in New Jersey was tremendous in general.74
Finally, as to the fourth factor, “[u]sage of the upland sand land by the
owner,” the court found that, prior to 1996, the Atlantis beach
property had been open to the public, and that a development
immediately inland of Atlantis—which had preceded the construction
of Atlantis—had been required to cede public access to a portion of
the same beach in order to obtain a development permit.75
Specifically, the earlier development had to allow public access to a
220-foot-wide portion of its beach in order to obtain a development
permit under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act of 1973 (CAFRA).76

significance, as none of the other states surveyed in this Comment have been willing
to draw such a connection. The message sent by the Raleigh Avenue court was that just
as the prevailing public foreshore activity during Roman times (fishing) required
public usage of the dry sand area, so, too, do modern trust-protected activities. Thus,
even if state ownership only extends as high as the mean high tide line, fulfillment of
the public trust doctrine requires public access to more of the beach than just a narrow
strip of land.
72
Id. at 121. The horizontal length of the Atlantis tract (along the length of the
ocean) was about 480 feet. Id.
73
Id. at 121–22. Specifically, the court noted that Wildwood Crest, the
municipality immediately to the north of Lower Township, had public beaches, and
that a private beachfront development adjacent to Atlantis within Lower Township
allowed public access at a DEP-approved fee (a fee similar to those charged at the
public beaches of nearby towns, and substantially less than that charged by Atlantis).
Id. at 122. Directly to the south of Atlantis was a piece of Coast Guard-owned beach
property, which was closed to the public for most of the summer season. Id.
74
Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 122.
75
Id. at 122–23.
76
Id. The earlier-built development (immediately inland, or west, of Atlantis) had
owned the Atlantis beach before selling it to the developer who built Atlantis. Id.
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In spite of this history of public access to what eventually became the
Atlantis-owned beach, however, Atlantis closed off its beach to nonmembers in 1996.77
Based upon this application of the Matthews factors, the court held
that Atlantis must make its upland sand area above the foreshore
available to the public under the public trust doctrine.78 In so holding,
the court specifically highlighted the long history of public access to
this tract of beach prior to 1996, the CAFRA permit granted to the preAtlantis development that previously owned this stretch of beach, the
high public demand for beaches, the lack of publicly owned beaches
in Lower Township, and the fact that Atlantis had been using the
upland sand area as part of its business enterprise.79 The court
generally adopted the position on beach access fees that the Appellate
Division had proposed below—that Atlantis could charge the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)-approved fees to the
public in order to cover its costs of providing beach services.80
The three decisions discussed above—Neptune City, Matthews, and
Raleigh Avenue—form the core of New Jersey’s modern public trust
doctrine jurisprudence as it relates to the question of beach access.
These three New Jersey Supreme Court decisions have ensured that
the public’s rights under the doctrine will be enforced. The first,
Neptune City, extended the public’s rights under the doctrine to
include a right to use the upland dry sand areas of publicly owned
beaches, announced a right to conduct modern recreational uses
beyond the traditional protected uses of navigation and fishing, and
established that municipalities cannot discriminate between residents
and nonresidents in charging beach access fees.81 The second,
77

Id. at 122.
Id. at 124. The Raleigh Avenue court’s reliance on and extensive discussion of
the Matthews factors cemented their importance in determining public trust access
rights to privately owned beachfront properties in New Jersey. As a result, Raleigh
Avenue demonstrates that New Jersey courts are serious about enforcing a functional,
living version of the public trust doctrine, ensuring that it guarantees actual public
access in practice as opposed to simply in theory.
79
Id. Two of the seven Justices of the court dissented, arguing that: (1) the
existing public vertical access to the foreshore (via the narrow easement across
Atlantis-owned dry sand defined by the trial court) and the available access to an
adjacent privately owned beach (which allowed public access at DEP-approved fees)
were sufficient to satisfy the needs of the public; and (2) while a three-foot-wide area
of public upland sand access on Atlantis’ property would be insufficient for horizontal
access, the proper balance would be to allow public access on a ten-foot-wide area—
not on the entire upland sand area. Id. at 128–29 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
80
Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 124–25.
81
See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–
55 (N.J. 1972).
78
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Matthews, built upon the doctrine further by requiring a quasi-publicly
owned association to provide reasonable public access to both the
foreshore and to some of its upland sand areas in order to
accommodate the expanded dry sand rights and recreational use
rights announced in Neptune City.82 Matthews also established a set of
factors for the consideration of public trust rights on other quasipublicly owned and privately owned beachfront lands.83 The third,
Raleigh Avenue, applied the Matthews factors directly to a privately
owned parcel; the court concluded that the public trust doctrine
required public access both across and within the privately owned dry
sand area of that parcel.84 These three decisions have solidified public
trust rights in New Jersey, even in privately owned shoreline areas. As
the next section of this Comment will demonstrate, however, nearby
states do not guarantee the same high level of public trust rights
protection as New Jersey.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND BEACH ACCESS IN NEARBY
STATES
This section explores the public trust doctrine as it pertains to
beach access in six other states geographically close to New Jersey:
Maryland, Delaware, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Massachusetts. While the doctrines of these states vary—considerably,
in some instances—all of them fall far short of the high level of public
beach access rights provided by the New Jersey doctrine.
A. Maryland
The existence of the public trust doctrine has been established in
Maryland for centuries and, under the doctrine, state ownership of
tidal lands reaches the mean high tide line.85 Two cases define
Maryland’s modern public trust doctrine as it pertains to beach access.
The first is Department of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, which
the state’s high court, the Maryland Court of Appeals, decided in
1975.86 At issue was essentially the same question, albeit in a different
form, that the Supreme Court of New Jersey answered in Raleigh Avenue
decades later—what, if any, rights the public had under the public trust
doctrine to access the dry sand area of a privately owned beach above
82

See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358, 365–66 (N.J.

1984).
83
84
85
86

See id. at 366.
See Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 124.
Craig, supra note 5, at 64.
Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630 (Md. 1975).
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the publicly owned foreshore.87 Specifically, a developer sought to
build a condominium on the dry sand area of an oceanfront lot; the
case involved a challenge against the developer’s application on the
grounds that the condominium would exclude the public from the dry
sand area.88 The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that “there can be
little doubt” as to the public’s right to use the foreshore and traced this
right in Maryland back to the pre-Revolutionary era.89 The court
quickly qualified this right, however, explaining that the public trust
doctrine only protects the public’s right to access and use the
foreshore, and that any claim of right to access or use the dry sand area
upland of the foreshore “must find support elsewhere”—outside of the
public trust doctrine.90 Thus, the court established that the public has
no right under the doctrine to access or use privately owned dry sand
areas above the foreshore.91 The court brushed away arguments by the
petitioners, who claimed that they had public trust rights to use the dry
sand area, as to the history and purpose of the public trust doctrine,
holding instead that such considerations could not override the private
landowner’s rights to the dry sand area.92
The second important Maryland decision to address the public
trust doctrine in the context of beach access rights is Clickner v. Magothy
River Ass’n, a 2012 case also decided by the Maryland Court of
Appeals.93 The case developed after a couple, the Clickners, purchased
Dobbins Island, a small island in the tidal Magothy River with an
extensive history of public use.94 After purchasing Dobbins Island, the
87

See id. at 632. The court noted that this was an issue of first impression in
Maryland. Id. A significant portion of this case turned on whether the public had
acquired an implied easement to the dry sand area of the specific piece of private
property in question. See id. This issue was separate from the public trust issue and
will not be discussed in this Comment.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 633.
90
Id. at 634.
91
Id. (explaining that a grant of the dry sand area to a private owner leads to the
result that the “rights of fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish and
seaweed and of passing and repassing have been pro tanto extinguished by the prior
grant” to the private owner).
92
Ocean City, 332 A.2d at 637. Specifically, in a manner that seemed to foreshadow
similar arguments made (and accepted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey) decades
later in Raleigh Avenue, the petitioners argued “that fish cannot be salted or dried, or
cabins or huts constructed, or twigs and branches gathered on the foreshore, which is
subject to continuous tidal action, therefore placing some of it under water a
considerable portion of each day.” See id. The Maryland court was not convinced,
holding instead that private ownership rights shall prevail. Id.
93
Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464 (Md. 2012).
94
See id. at 467–68. The Magothy River is an extension of Chesapeake Bay. The
court’s opinion provides detail as to the storied history of Dobbins Island, which had
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Clickners placed “No Trespassing” signs around the island and erected
a fence along its perimeter, just above the mean high tide line.95 The
Magothy River Association and six individuals (collectively “the River
Association”) subsequently brought suit against the Clickners, “seeking
to establish a public right to use” part of the island.96
The court recognized, and neither party disputed, that the public
trust doctrine provided that the State of Maryland owned the tidal
lands of Dobbins Island up to the mean high tide line “for the benefit
of its citizens.”97 As such, that line marked the delineation between
public ownership below the mean high tide line and the Clickners’
private ownership above that line.98 The court then found that the
right asserted by the River Association to use the dry sand area on
Dobbins Island above the mean high tide line—behind the Clickners’
new fence—could not be grounded in the public trust doctrine
because the doctrine does not cover lands above the foreshore.99
Quoting Ocean City, the court determined that the River Association
could only use the dry sand area on Dobbins Island if it could show
that it had either an implied or express easement allowing it to do so;
the public trust doctrine was of no avail.100
Thus, Ocean City and Clickner both flatly deny the existence of
public trust rights above the mean high tide line and strictly limit
permissible public trust beach access to the foreshore.101 As such,
Maryland’s public trust doctrine offers far less beach access than New
Jersey’s doctrine; Maryland’s doctrine, unlike New Jersey’s, offers no
vertical or horizontal access to public trust lands. That said, some of
the states discussed in this Comment, especially Delaware, have an
even more limited public trust doctrine than Maryland.
B. Delaware
An early expression of Delaware’s public trust doctrine, from
1851, noted the existence of the doctrine in Delaware and announced
that private landowners owned to the low tide line, but maintained that
the public does have a right to conduct fishing and navigation on the

been privately owned since prior to the Revolution but had nevertheless been subject
to frequent visitation by the public during the ensuing centuries. Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 466.
97
Id. at 473.
98
Id.
99
Clickner, 35 A.3d at 473–74.
100
Id. at 474.
101
See infra discussion Part III.A.
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foreshore.102 The public trust doctrine has not generated much
litigation in Delaware during recent times, and the only modern case
pertinent to this discussion is an unpublished trial court decision from
1994, Groves v. Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources &
Environmental Control.103 Because Groves is the only Delaware case on
the public trust doctrine relevant to the question of public beach
access, only Groves will be discussed in this Comment.
In Groves, a private landowner holding waterfront property on
Rehoboth Bay wanted to place rip-rap along the foreshore of her
property to prevent erosion.104 In order to gain permission to do so,
she sought, and was eventually granted, a permit from the state
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Control (DNREC).105 The rip-rap was subsequently constructed; it
“covered an area between the mean high tide, or water, line and the
mean low tide, or water, line,” such that “[t]he only time any beach was
exposed was at low tide and then, only a minimal amount was
exposed.”106 Groves, a neighboring property owner, appealed the
DNREC’s granting of the permit on public trust grounds, along with
other, unrelated grounds, when the construction of the rip-rap
began.107 Specifically, Groves argued that the public trust doctrine
required public access to the foreshore, which the rip-rap now blocked,
for purposes of walking, sunbathing, and recreation.108 Groves cited
Matthews, from the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as persuasive
authority.109
The court quickly distinguished Matthews, noting that the New
Jersey decision does not bind the Delaware courts.110 In particular, the
court noted that New Jersey law differs considerably from Delaware law
in the realm of the public trust because the State of New Jersey owns
the foreshore, whereas the State of Delaware only owns up to the mean
low tide line; the foreshore is, as a result, owned by private landowners
in Delaware.111 While the public does have certain rights to use the
102

Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 325, 325 (Del. Super. Ct. 1851).
Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 1994
WL 89804 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994).
104
Id. at *1.
105
Id. at *1–2.
106
Id. at *2.
107
Id. at *2, 5.
108
Id. at *5.
109
Groves, 1994 WL 89804, at *5.
110
Id. at *5.
111
Id. (“[T]he New Jersey law on this issue is of no value at all.”). The court’s
explicit decision not to follow Matthews and the New Jersey doctrine is hardly
103
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foreshore in Delaware that are superior to private landowners’ rights—
those of fishing and of navigation by boat, the rights that the court
stated “constitute the public trust doctrine”—the doctrine has never
given “a right of the public superior to the landowner to access to the
foreshore for walking and/or recreational activities.”112 Indeed, the
court went so far as to determine that, if it or the state legislature were
to find in the public trust doctrine such a right to walk and/or recreate
along the foreshore, Delaware would have to compensate private
waterfront landowners for a taking.113
Though Groves is an unpublished opinion by a Delaware trial
court, rather than by the Delaware Supreme Court, there have been
no contrary statements of law in Delaware in the twenty years since its
decision. As a result, Groves appears to be an accurate statement of the
modern public trust doctrine in Delaware. The decision establishes
the extent of the public trust doctrine in Delaware: the State only owns
from the mean low tide line seaward, and the public’s right to use the
foreshore is limited to navigation by boat and fishing.114 The Groves
court specifically declined to follow Matthews, or to even recognize a
public trust right to walk along the foreshore or to conduct
recreational activities there.115 Delaware may thus have the most
limited public trust doctrine of the seven states surveyed in this
Comment.
C. New York
The public trust doctrine of New York was, in similar fashion to
the doctrines of the other states surveyed herein, derived directly from
the English common law.116 As in Delaware, New York has scant
litigation on the public trust doctrine and, as a result, has scant
litigation on the doctrine as it relates to beach access; in fact, few
modern cases address the issue even tangentially. In that respect, both
New York and Delaware stand in stark contrast to the attention and
importance given to the public trust doctrine in the beach access
context in New Jersey. In spite of the general lack of precedent,
however, New York clearly has a more expansive public trust doctrine
than Delaware. Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, a lower court case decided

surprising, considering the large differences (as noted by the court) between Delaware
and New Jersey public trust law.
112
Id. at *6.
113
Id.
114
See infra discussion Part III.B.
115
Id.
116
See Trustees of Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 665 (N.Y. 1907).
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in 1970, is the most recent statement of law on the matter.117
At issue in Arnold’s Inn was an area of fill that the defendant, a
private landowner, had placed atop the foreshore adjacent to his
property in order to elevate that area above the mean high tide line.118
The plaintiff, a nearby restaurant owner, argued that the fill
constituted a trespass on public lands by the defendant.119 In deciding
the case, the court referred to its public trust doctrine via the Roman—
and, later, English—concepts of the jus publicum and jus privatum.120
The court defined the jus publicum as “the right shared by all to
navigate upon the waters covering the foreshore at high tide and, at
low tide, to have access across the foreshore to the waters for fishing,
bathing or any other lawful purpose,” and the jus privatum as “the right
of the owner to the foreshore.”121 The court noted that a landowner is
permitted to fill in the foreshore and, thus, to extinguish the jus
publicum as to the filled-in piece of foreshore, but nevertheless held
that the defendant’s fill constituted a trespass against the Town of
North Hempstead (“the Town”), in which the property was located,
because “title to the land beyond the high-water line of Manhasset Bay
is vested in the . . . Town.”122 Thus, regardless of whether the defendant
could theoretically fill in the foreshore, he was not permitted to do so
without first receiving a grant from the Town, or, otherwise, without
satisfying the elements of adverse possession or of prescriptive
easement.123 There had been no grant of the foreshore by the Town to
the defendant, and the court found that the defendant had not
satisfied the elements of adverse possession or prescription, so it
117

Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), modified,
317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
118
Id. at 546.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 547.
121
Id. The jus publicum/jus privatum framework is the public trust doctrine in
different terms—it has the same impact, regardless of what it is called. After the Magna
Carta came into force in England, tidal lands below the high tide line were divided
into two categories: (1) the jus privatum, representing the king’s ownership interest in
the land; and (2) the jus publicum, representing that the king held the land as a
sovereign for the people. The jus publicum was thus held in public trust. Boston
Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Mass. 1979). After the
rise of Parliament, the jus publicum was understood to be in the control of the
Parliament, while the jus privatum remained with the king. Id. Because neither had a
full property interest in the land, neither could convey said land, and so it remained
open to the public. Id.
122
Id. at 547–49.
123
Arnold’s Inn, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 548–49. The court noted that the foreshore is
indeed alienable, such that the town could convey it to a private landowner or lose it
by prescription. Id. at 548.
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ordered the defendant to remove the fill placed beyond the original
mean high-water line.124
Arnold’s Inn makes clear that public trust ownership—the jus
publicum, to use the court’s terminology—extends to the mean high
tide line in New York.125 This case also establishes that fishing and
navigation are not the only protected public uses of the foreshore
under the doctrine, because the court also mentions “bathing” and
“any other lawful purpose” as being protected.126 Additionally,
although the court did not find a violation of the public trust doctrine
by the defendant’s placement of fill, it did find that said fill was a
trespass against title held by the Town in the foreshore.127 Thus, while
Arnold’s Inn certainly does not approach the scope of the New Jersey
public trust doctrine, it does establish that the state owns the entire
foreshore and, more significantly, that the public has a right to access
it—for purposes beyond just fishing and navigation—when sand is
exposed there at low tide.
D. Connecticut
Connecticut directly inherited the public trust doctrine from the
English common law after the Revolution, and state ownership has
always extended to the mean high tide line under its version of the
doctrine.128 Case law on the doctrine is scarce, but a 2001 decision,
Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, contains language that directly addresses
the public trust doctrine as it relates to beach access.129 In Leydon, at
issue was whether the Town of Greenwich (“Greenwich”) could restrict
access to a shorefront town park to only its residents and their guests.130
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found Greenwich’s
restriction of access to be unconstitutional under both the federal and
state constitutions, for reasons wholly unrelated to the public trust
doctrine.131 The appellate court below, however, had specifically

124

Id.
Id. at 547.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 547–49.
128
See Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38, 40 (Conn. 1831).
129
Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001).
130
Id. at 557–58. The park, Greenwich Point, included a beach on Long Island
Sound. Id. at 559. The court noted that access to the park was only possible via a
“piece of land known as Tod’s Driftway (driftway), which [was] owned by . . . a private
association of landowners . . . . The town [held] an easement over a private road on
the driftway that provide[d] the only means by which a person seeking to enter
Greenwich Point by land [could] do so.” Id.
131
Id. at 557.
125
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discussed the public trust doctrine in deciding against Greenwich,132 so
the Supreme Court of Connecticut decided to address the doctrine for
purposes of clarification.133
The Connecticut Supreme Court first noted that the appellate
court below had, in fact, conflated the public trust doctrine with
another area of law, but nevertheless addressed the doctrine in some
detail in a footnote.134 Specifically, the court explained that the
Connecticut version of the public trust doctrine includes a public right
to access the foreshore “from the mean high tide line to the water,”
but also noted that “it does not also give a member of the public the
right to gain access to that portion of the beach by crossing the beach
landward of the mean high tide line.”135 Thus, the court determined
that the public trust doctrine was of no avail to the plaintiff because
the doctrine would give the plaintiff no right to reach the foreshore of
Greenwich Point from upland areas; additionally, even if the plaintiff
could somehow legally reach the foreshore, his access would only
include the foreshore itself.136
As such, Leydon clearly and concretely states that the public trust
doctrine in Connecticut does not include any right to vertical access to
the foreshore from upland areas, nor does it include any horizontal
right to access upland sand areas above the foreshore.137 Leydon places
Connecticut’s version of the doctrine in the middle of the states
surveyed: more expansive than the version employed by Delaware,
because the State of Connecticut has full public ownership of the
foreshore up to the mean high tide line, but far more limited than that
of New Jersey, which includes the rights of vertical and horizontal
access through and to upland sand areas that the Leydon court denied.
The Connecticut doctrine appears to be more or less identical to the
Maryland doctrine.138

132

Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 750 A.2d 1122, 1126–27 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001).
133
Leydon, 777 A.2d at 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
See supra discussion Part III.D.
138
See supra discussion Part III.A. As discussed above, Maryland, like Connecticut,
fully owns the foreshore in trust, but has explicitly denied any public trust right to
vertical and/or horizontal access to said foreshore.
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E. Rhode Island
The Rhode Island public trust doctrine, which derives from the
common law, extends state ownership up to the mean high tide line.139
The doctrine is also codified in both Rhode Island’s state
constitution140 and in a statute.141 In addition to the constitutional and
statutory provisions outlining the public trust doctrine, there is
extensive Rhode Island case law—in contrast to some of the other
states surveyed in this Comment—on the doctrine. This Comment
discusses the three most salient examples of this case law below.
The first important case that can be considered part of Rhode
Island’s modern public trust doctrine in the beach access realm is
Jackvony v. Powel, which the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided in
1941.142 In that case, a commission of the City of Newport sought to
construct a six-foot-high wire fence across the beach on the border of
Newport and another town, extending from the mean high tide line
down to the mean low tide line, in order “[t]o keep nonresidents from
using the beach for nothing and thus protect Newport taxpayers.”143
The court struck down the proposed fence as unconstitutional under
the Rhode Island Constitution, noting that such fences would frustrate
the public’s rights to “fishing, bathing, boating, getting seaweed or
sand, or for exercise or any other purpose.”144
Over forty years later, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
decided State v. Ibbison, an equally important case in the state’s public
trust doctrine history.145 In Ibbison, the defendants were conducting a
“beach-clean-up” operation along a Rhode Island beach when a private
beachfront landowner, accompanied by a police officer, stopped

139

See Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166, 166 (R.I. 1895).
One section of the Rhode Island Constitution points to “the rights of the people
to enjoy and freely exercise the rights of fishery and the privileges of the shore.” R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 16. The following section specifies these privileges as including “fishing
from the shore, the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea and
passage along the shore.” R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
141
A Rhode Island statute implicitly mentions the public trust doctrine; it points
directly to the constitutional provisions quoted supra note 140, and specifies that the
State of Rhode Island “has historically maintained title in fee simple to all soil within
its boundaries that lies below the high water mark.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-5-1.2 (West
2014).
142
Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554 (R.I. 1941).
143
Id. at 554–55 (quotation marks omitted).
144
Id. at 558. The constitutional provision that the court held to be offended was
article I, section 17, which is essentially a constitutional codification of the public trust
doctrine. See supra note 140.
145
State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (R.I. 1982).
140
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them.146 The defendants were subsequently convicted of criminal
trespass.147 At the time of their arrests, the defendants were located
landward of the mean high tide line, but seaward of the high water
mark, defined by the defendants at the trial court as “a visible line on
the shore indicated by the reach of an average high tide and further
indicated by drifts and seaweed along the shore.”148 The direct issue
before the court was how to calculate the boundary line of public trust
ownership to determine whether a trespass occurred.149
After reviewing Rhode Island precedent and the common law
public trust doctrine, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined
that the state constitution’s guarantees of public rights extend to the
mean high tide line—not to the high water mark, which is above the
mean high tide line during periods of higher-than-normal tides (as was
the case when the defendants were on the beach).150 The court found
that setting the demarcation line dividing public and private
ownership at the mean high tide line, instead of the high water mark,
struck the best balance between the interests of the public and the
beachfront landowners.151 Setting the line above the mean high tide
line at the high water mark, according to the court, would deprive
private landowners of their rights, and setting the demarcation line
below the mean high tide line would deprive the public of its rights.152
Nevertheless, the court, noting the confusion of previous Rhode Island
decisions in determining the exact line of the extent of public
ownership, affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the trespassing
charges against the defendants.153 Additionally, the court held that
municipalities pursuing such trespassing charges against members of
the public in the future must be able to prove that the would-be
trespassers knew that they were located above—and had intentionally

146

Id. at 729.
Id.
148
Id. It is worth noting that, at the time of the defendant’s arrest, the mean high
tide line was under water. Id. at 729–30.
149
Id. at 730.
150
See id. at 732.
151
Ibbison, 448 A.2d at 732.
152
Id. (“Setting the boundary at the point where spring tides reach would unfairly
take from littoral owners land that is dry for most of the month. Similarly, setting
[it] . . . at the [] mean low tide [line] would so restrict the size of the shore as to render
it practically nonexistent.”).
153
Id. at 733 (“In view of the lack of clarity in early decisions of this court regarding
whether the landward boundary of the shoreline was to be computed as a mean or as
an absolute high-water mark, we shall affirm the dismissals of the charges . . . but for
different reasons.”).
147
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crossed—the mean high tide line.154
A third—and perhaps even more relevant, for purposes of this
Comment—Rhode Island case dealing with the public trust doctrine
and beach access is Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, an unpublished
1997 trial court decision that offers a clear statement of current Rhode
Island law on the matter.155 In Cavanaugh, the plaintiff was charged
with a misdemeanor after he attempted, without paying the beach
access fee, to cross the dry sand area of a public beach in order to reach
the foreshore below the dry sand area.156 Abutting the public beach
were private properties and structures that completely blocked the
public from having any “perpendicular” access to the foreshore—
equivalent to what New Jersey courts call “vertical” access, and which
will be referred to as “vertical” access subsequently in this Comment—
such that only the publicly owned, fee-charging beach afforded the
general public any vertical access to said foreshore.157 The plaintiff
sued, arguing that the Town of Narragansett could not deprive the
public of vertical access to an otherwise inaccessible area of foreshore
by charging fees.158
The court interpreted article I, section 17 of the Rhode Island
Constitution to determine whether the public trust doctrine required
vertical access to the foreshore; it found that “the provision by its own
language provides absolutely no indication that a right of [vertical]
access across the property of others exists.”159 According to the court,
even if the public trust doctrine did provide for vertical access to the
foreshore, the Town of Narragansett would still be able to charge the
beach access fees that it did in this case.160 Additionally, the court
found no support for the plaintiff’s argument that the public trust
doctrine implicates the dry sand area above the mean high tide line.161
Taking Jackvony, Ibbison, and Cavanaugh together, Rhode Island’s
public trust doctrine presents a mixture of both expansive and limited
rights in the realm of beach access.162 On one hand, two articles of the
154

Id.
Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997).
156
Id. at *2.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at *5. In tracing the history of the common law public trust doctrine and
applying that history to article I, section 17, the court found a lack of any right to
vertical access. Id. at *9.
160
Id. at *11.
161
Cavanaugh, 1997 WL 1098081, at *7.
162
See supra discussion Part III.E.
155
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state constitution and a state statute have codified the public trust
doctrine in Rhode Island and provide, in sum, that the doctrine goes
beyond fishing and navigation to include a right of “passage along the
shore” and other recreational activities that are not protected in some
of the other states surveyed in this Comment.163 Jackvony affirms these
rights as indeed part of the doctrine and establishes that fences cannot
be erected that block off the foreshore and prevent the public from
passing along it.164 On the other hand, Cavanaugh illustrates that there
is simply no public right to vertical access to the foreshore, setting the
Rhode Island doctrine apart from the New Jersey doctrine in that
manner.165 Additionally, Ibbison implicitly shows that Rhode Island
does not recognize a public trust right to use any of the dry sand area
landward of the mean high tide line, because anyone who does so
intentionally risks being convicted of trespass.166 Thus, Rhode Island’s
public trust doctrine provides the public with substantial rights in the
foreshore itself, but provides no vertical access through or horizontal
access to upland dry sand areas.
F. Massachusetts
Like the other states surveyed in this Comment, Massachusetts
inherited its public trust doctrine directly from the English common
law.167 Unlike most of the other states, however, Massachusetts broke
away from the English model when it determined that the seaward
extent of private property ownership was the low tide line instead of
the high tide line.168 This change in the law, which pre-dated the
Revolution by more than a century, was an accommodation for the
building of wharves by private landowners along the shoreline.169 The
Massachusetts courts later placed one important condition on the
expanded ownership rights of private landowners to the low tide line:
landowners cannot impede the navigation of boats.170 Massachusetts
has rich case law on the public trust doctrine, but two cases, in
particular, best outline Massachusetts’ modern doctrine in the context
of beach access.
163

See supra notes 140 & 141.
See Jackvony v. Powel, 21 A.2d 554, 558 (R.I. 1941).
165
See Cavanaugh, 1997 WL 1098081, at *5.
166
See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1982).
167
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358–59
(Mass. 1979).
168
Id. at 359–60.
169
Id. The change to private ownership down to the low tide line can be traced in
official capacity as far back as the colonial ordinance of 1647. Id. at 360.
170
Id. at 360–61.
164
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The first salient case on the matter, Opinion of the Justices, is actually
an answer by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the State’s
highest court, submitted in response to a question posed by the
Massachusetts House of Representatives about a proposed bill.171 The
proposed bill sought to codify a public right to “on-foot free right-ofpassage” through the area “between the mean high water line and the
extreme low water line.”172 The court noted that the public has
“limited” rights to use the shore.173 As an example of the limited nature
of these rights, the court cited the contrary right of a waterfront
landowner to build on his property to the extent that the public is
completely excluded from it, as long as he does not block the
navigation of boats.174 Thus, the court held that there was no authority
whatsoever to grant the public “a right to walk on the beach.”175
According to the court, the proposed bill would actually have gone so
far as to constitute a public taking under the Massachusetts
Constitution, necessitating the payment of compensation to
beachfront landowners.176 The court also explicitly declined to
endorse the more expansive version of public trust doctrine rights that
the Supreme Court of New Jersey espoused only two years prior in
Neptune City.177
The second important Massachusetts case is Sheftel v. Lebel, a 1998
intermediate appellate court decision that squarely addressed the
question of vertical access to the foreshore.178 At issue in Sheftel was an
easement held by the defendants across the plaintiffs’ property to a
tidal body of water.179 The defendants argued that the easement should
be extended from its ending point at the mean high tide line down to
the mean low water line, and sought to build a pier for their boat out
171

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974).
Id. at 563–65.
173
Id. at 566.
174
Id. (“[A] littoral owner may build on his tidal land so as to exclude the public
completely as long as he does not unreasonably interfere with navigation.”).
175
Id. at 566–67.
176
Id. at 568. For an example of another state court similarly determining that
granting such a right would constitute a taking, see Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural
Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003, 1994 WL 89804, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8,
1994) (finding that a public right to walk along the shoreline would constitute a taking
and result in necessary compensation payments to beachfront landowners).
177
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E. 2d at 567 (“Whatever may be the propriety of
such an interpretation . . . the grant to private parties effected by the colonial
ordinance [of 1647] has never been interpreted to provide the littoral owners only
such uncertain and ephemeral rights . . . . The rights of the public though strictly
protected have also been strictly confined . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
178
Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
179
Id. at 501.
172
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to that line, while the plaintiffs argued that the easement should not
be extended beyond the mean high tide line.180 While the other facts
of the case are not particularly relevant to this Comment, the court’s
discussion of the public trust doctrine, analyzed below, is indeed very
salient.
At the outset, the court noted that private landowners in
Massachusetts own property down to the low tide line, in contrast to
the typical common law rule—followed in most other states—granting
private ownership only to the high tide line.181 The court also noted,
significantly, that the foreshore has nevertheless always been subject to
the public trust doctrine, which establishes that the public holds a
reserved easement to use the foreshore for “fishing, fowling, and
navigation.”182 The court subsequently qualified its statement by also
determining that the public has no right to “perpendicular” (vertical)
access under the public trust doctrine through privately owned upland
property to reach the foreshore, noting that anyone who crosses such
property to access the foreshore is guilty of trespass.183 Easements, such
as the one that existed in this case, are therefore necessary for any
member of the public to have lawful access across another’s privately
owned upland sand area to the foreshore below.184
The Sheftel court explained the Massachusetts public trust
doctrine in a very precise manner: private landowners own the land to
the low water line, the public has an easement to use the foreshore for
a few specific purposes, and there is no right to vertical access to the
foreshore from upland areas.185 Opinion of the Justices is also chiefly
important as an exposition of the public trust doctrine in
Massachusetts, as it clearly declares that the doctrine contains no
public right to walk along the beach.186 Taken together, Opinion of the
Justices and Sheftel illustrate that Massachusetts clearly falls on the more
180

Id.
Id. at 503.
182
Id. at 505.
183
Id. (“The public has, however, no right of perpendicular access across private
upland property, i.e., no right to cross, without permission, the dry land of another for
the purpose of gaining access to the water or the flats in order to exercise public trust
rights; doing so constitutes a trespass.”).
184
See Sheftel, 689 N.E.2d at 505. The court noted that the easement’s purpose was
to allow access to the foreshore and that no extension of that easement to the low
water line was necessary for the defendants because the public trust doctrine protects
the public’s right of boating on the foreshore. Id. Therefore, an easement extending
as far as the mean high tide line sufficed to give the defendants access to the water for
boating. Id.
185
See id. at 503–05.
186
See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 567 (Mass. 1974).
181
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limited end of the spectrum in terms of the scope of rights it grants
under its public trust doctrine. In particular, Delaware is the only
other state in which private ownership extends to the mean low tide
line, and there is no right to vertical access to the foreshore or
horizontal access to the dry sand area above the foreshore in
Massachusetts. Thus, public trust rights in Massachusetts are limited
to a reserved public easement to conduct the traditional trustprotected activities of fishing, fowling, and navigation in the privately
owned foreshore, and do not include any guarantee of vertical access.
IV. OF THE STATES SURVEYED, NEW JERSEY BEST IMPLEMENTS THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
New Jersey has the most expansive version of the public trust
doctrine of the states surveyed in this Comment with regard to beach
access. Its recognition of public trust rights of both vertical access
(across upland sand areas to the publicly owned foreshore) and
horizontal access (parallel to the ocean along the length of the beach
and encompassing dry sand areas above the foreshore) guarantees that
the public trust doctrine is far more than a legal theory; it allows for
real access to, and true enjoyment of, public trust lands.187 In contrast,
the doctrines of the other six states contain no rights of vertical access
through, or horizontal access to, dry sand areas; thus, public trust
rights in these states often exist in theory only and may be of little use
in practice.188
First, without the key right of vertical access that New Jersey courts
have found, the public trust doctrine is largely without force, because
without vertical access, members of the public may have no means
whatsoever by which to physically reach public trust lands.189 As will be
reiterated below, none of the other six states provide for any degree of
vertical access within their respective versions of the public trust
doctrine; thus, access to the foreshore may be impossible in portions
of these states.
In Maryland, though the applicable case law does not explicitly
refer to vertical access, the two cases reviewed in this Comment clearly
187

See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112,
121, 124 (N.J. 2005).
188
See, e.g., Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 634 (Md.
1975). This is but one example of the numerous statements of law rendered by courts
outside of New Jersey, discussed in this Comment, denying the public of vertical access
rights to the foreshore through upland areas.
189
See, e.g., Sheftel, 689 N.E.2d at 505 (noting that, in Massachusetts, an easement is
required for the public to cross privately owned upland sand areas in order to reach
the public trust-protected foreshore).
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establish that the public has no right to such access.190 The Ocean City
court plainly held that the public trust doctrine only confers a right to
use the foreshore itself; in fact, it specifically denied that the doctrine
lends any support to the notion that the public has a right to cross
upland areas in order to reach the foreshore.191 The Clickner court
affirmed this narrow doctrine when it held that the public cannot
access privately owned dry sand areas without an easement.192 The
collective force of Ocean City and Clickner establishes that the public
trust doctrine in Maryland only protects the public’s limited right in
the foreshore itself, without any corresponding protection of the
public’s ability to physically reach the foreshore. As a result, the public
may not have any way to actually access the otherwise publicly owned
Maryland foreshore in spite of its purportedly guaranteed right to said
foreshore.
Delaware, too, has implicitly rejected any notion of vertical access
to public trust lands. In Groves, a Delaware trial court refused to follow
New Jersey’s Matthews decision.193 While the Groves opinion did not
directly address vertical access, its rejection of Matthews and its finding
of very limited public rights, encompassing only fishing and navigation
in Delaware’s privately owned foreshore, indicate that the idea of
vertical access in Delaware is rather far-fetched.194 In fact, Delaware’s
public trust doctrine is so limited that even if Delaware recognized a
public right of vertical access to the foreshore, it would not constitute
a significant public right because the Groves court held that the
doctrine includes no right in the public to even walk along or conduct
recreational activities within the foreshore, apart from the limited
allowance of fishing and boating.195
New York courts have affirmed public ownership of the foreshore,
as the court established in Arnold’s Inn.196 That said, no case in New
York has addressed the question of whether a right of vertical access
actually exists. Without any statement of case law or statutory authority
establishing such a right, there is no indication that the public would
be able to cross privately owned upland areas to reach the foreshore in
New York without committing trespass, because vertical access is the
190

See supra discussion Part III.A.
See Ocean City, 332 A.2d at 634.
192
See Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464, 473–74 (Md. 2012).
193
See Groves v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Natural Res. & Envtl. Control, No. 92A-10-003,
1994 WL 89804, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1994).
194
See id. at *5–6.
195
See id. at *6.
196
See Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 310 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970),
modified, 317 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970).
191
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rare exception, rather than the rule, among the states surveyed.
Connecticut has provided a statement of law clear enough to
prevent any misinterpretation on the question of whether a right to
vertical access to the foreshore exists in the state—there is no such
right.197 The Leydon court clearly established two principles in its brief
discussion of the public trust doctrine: (1) the public has a right to
access the foreshore, but (2) the public has no right to reach said
foreshore by crossing upland areas.198 As a result, Connecticut’s
doctrine is typical of the surveyed states: it has a publicly owned
foreshore, which the public theoretically has the right to access, but
the public has no right to vertically access that foreshore, leading to
the potential scenario—as would have been the case in Leydon had the
court not struck down the Town of Greenwich’s restriction on access
for constitutional reasons—of a publicly owned foreshore that is
physically impossible for the public to actually access, except, perhaps,
by boat.199 As such, Leydon is highly illustrative of the shortcomings of
a public trust doctrine without a right to vertical access.
Rhode Island, too, has explicitly denied that its public trust
doctrine—which is enshrined in its constitution and in statute—
includes a right to vertical access, as explained by the court in
Cavanaugh.200 Cavanaugh, like Leydon, dealt with vertical access to the
foreshore through publicly owned property; in Cavanaugh, however,
access was not restricted to a particular group, but was instead
regulated by a beach access fee.201 The court noted, as the New Jersey
courts have, that a municipality can charge a beach access fee without
interfering with public trust rights.202 The Cavanaugh court also denied
the existence of a right to vertical access to the foreshore, as noted
above.203 Significantly, the public beach in Cavanaugh was surrounded
197

See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001).
See id.
199
See id. at 564 n.17, 565–66. The court noted that the public trust doctrine was
of no avail to the plaintiff, who had no right to access the publicly owned foreshore of
a publicly owned park under the public trust doctrine. See id. at 559, 564 n.17. Thus, if
not for the unrelated federal and state constitutional violations by the Town of
Greenwich, upon which grounds the court invalidated the Greenwich ordinance, the
plaintiff would have had no actual means by which to access this particular piece of
the foreshore. See id. at 565–75.
200
See Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at
*5 (R.I. Super. Oct. 10, 1997). The court interpreted the Rhode Island Constitution
narrowly, refusing to find a right to vertical access where one was not explicitly stated.
See id. Although Cavanaugh was not a decision of the state’s highest court, there has
been no contrary statement of law in Rhode Island since its decision in 1997.
201
See id. at *2.
202
See id. at *11.
203
See id. at *5.
198
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by privately owned parcels and beach structures that rendered the
foreshore entirely inaccessible to the public, save for the public beach
in question.204 It would not take a very different set of facts to render
the foreshore entirely inaccessible; had that public beach instead been
private, the Rhode Island doctrine still would not allow for any vertical
access to the foreshore, such that the foreshore would be entirely
inaccessible to the public that owns it.
Finally, Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine includes a similarly
specific denial of a right to vertical access, leading to the same
undesirable result of a foreshore that is potentially inaccessible to the
public that is intended to have a right to use it under the doctrine. The
Sheftel court explicitly stated that there is no right to vertical access
across upland areas to reach the foreshore; attempting to cross a
privately owned upland area to reach the foreshore constitutes a
trespass, unless the person seeking to cross the upland area has an
easement to do so, as the plaintiff in Sheftel indeed did.205 As in the
other states surveyed herein apart from New Jersey, Massachusetts’
public trust doctrine contains no means by which the public can
actually access the foreshore in which the doctrine establishes that it
has specific rights.
With the lack of vertical access to public trust lands that exists in
the six states other than New Jersey, there is no guarantee that the
public will have any way to reach the foreshore on foot without
committing trespass. The Matthews court said it best: “[w]ithout some
means of access[,] the public right to use the foreshore would be
meaningless.”206 Refusing to recognize any right to access the
foreshore would—to quote the Matthews court again—“seriously
impinge on, if not effectively eliminate, the rights of the public trust
doctrine.”207 Simply put, if the public cannot actually reach the
foreshore, public ownership of it is futile. And the importance of
vertical access goes beyond public policy. As the Matthews court
demonstrated in the quoted material above, the very functionality of
the public trust doctrine depends on the presence of at least some
degree of vertical access. In lieu of vertical access points, tracts of
private beachfront land can render the valuable foreshore entirely
inaccessible to the public, so that it serves no purpose to those who
purportedly hold it in trust. The significance of the public trust
doctrine thus depends on the existence of at least some degree of
204
205
206
207

See id.
See Sheftel v. Lebel, 689 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984).
Id.
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vertical access to the foreshore. Without such access, the public trust
doctrine is without force.
Second, without a right to horizontal access to at least some
portion of the upland dry sand area above the foreshore, the
usefulness of the public trust doctrine in the other six states is further
limited. Questions of horizontal access are closely tied to questions of
vertical access, as both implicate the upland dry sand area above the
foreshore. Thus, unsurprisingly, states that have denied a right to
vertical access have similarly denied a right to horizontal access—albeit
implicitly, since New Jersey is the only state to refer to “horizontal
access” as a separate concept. For example, the Ocean City court
rejected the petitioners’ arguments to the effect that at least some
usage of the dry sand area is necessary in order to enjoy the foreshore,
holding instead that the rights of private landowners who own such dry
sand areas trump any claim of right by the public.208 Similarly, the
Clickner court found that the public trust doctrine technically does not
cover the dry sand area above the mean high tide line and, thus, it
found no public right to use it.209 The Leydon court dealt directly with
vertical access, but implicated horizontal access as well by finding that
public trust access rights only include the foreshore itself.210 The
Ibbison court also implicitly denied any right to horizontal access,
finding that a person who knowingly and intentionally walks on a
privately owned dry sand area above the mean high tide line commits
trespass.211 Indeed, none of the non-New Jersey states have found any
form of public right of horizontal access to the dry sand area above the
foreshore.
The right to horizontal access is nearly as important as the right
to vertical access. Namely, by definition, the foreshore is completely
submerged at least once during the average day because seawater
reaches beyond the mean high tide line during the higher of the two
daily high tides. Additionally, during weather-related episodes of
higher-than-normal tides, the foreshore is submerged for extended
periods of time. As the Matthews court noted, the foreshore and the
ocean cannot be reasonably enjoyed “unless some enjoyment of the
208

See Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 637 (Md. 1975).
The court very specifically limited the public’s rights to the foreshore itself, finding
that the public trust doctrine only protects that narrow area and does not confer any
public right to use dry sand area above the foreshore. Id. at 634.
209
See Clickner v. Magothy River Ass’n, 35 A.3d 464, 473–74 (Md. 2012). As in
Ocean City and Sheftel, the court held that the dry sand area could only be used if an
easement to use it existed. See id. at 474.
210
See Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001).
211
See State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1982).
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dry sand area is also allowed.”212 Without any place for people to rest
and relax after swimming in the ocean, for example—and the dry sand
area may be the only place where a swimmer can physically rest and
relax without being subjected to ocean waves—it may be impossible for
the public to use the ocean for swimming.213 Clearly, while the other
six states surveyed apart from New Jersey do not recognize a right to
horizontal access, they all protect the public’s right to use the ocean,
considering the fact that the public trust doctrine covers all lands
seaward of either the mean high or mean low tide line in all of the
states surveyed herein. Thus, these six states fail to adequately protect
the public trust right to use the ocean by failing to protect any right to
use the dry sand area adjacent to the foreshore. Also, as the Raleigh
Avenue court noted, fishermen could use the dry sand area to haul and
dry their fishing nets under the Ancient Roman public trust doctrine,
a predecessor of the modern doctrine.214 Likewise, under the modern
public trust doctrine, people using the ocean should be able to use the
dry sand area to the extent necessary for modern enjoyment of the
ocean.215 Though the public trust doctrine may technically be limited
to public ownership of the foreshore and the waters beyond, it is clear
that, as the New Jersey courts have stated, any meaningful use of the
foreshore requires at least some use of the adjacent dry sand area.216
Third, the New Jersey version of the public trust doctrine does not
ignore the rights of private beachfront landowners; instead, it properly
balances these interests with those of the public. The Matthews court
stated in its holding that any public use of an area of upland dry sand
is to be “subject to an accommodation of the interests of the owner.”217
Clearly, the New Jersey doctrine does not extinguish the rights of
private landowners. In fact, the very existence of the Matthews factors
demonstrates that the New Jersey approach closely considers private
rights; if public trust rights were not balanced by private landowners’
rights, as they are under the Matthews factors, there would be no need
to determine the extent of public access rights—or whether there are
any such rights at all—on individual tracts of private beachfront land.218
Depending on the specific application of the Matthews factors to a
particular tract of privately owned beachfront land, an individual
212
213
214

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
See, e.g., id.
See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 120 (N.J.

2005).
215
216
217
218

See id.
See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365.
See id.
See id. at 365–66; see discussion supra Part II.
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landowner may have no obligation to allow the public onto any piece
of his or her upland dry sand area. Public access to the foreshore in
New Jersey is not all-encompassing, nor does it take up all privately
owned lands; the doctrine stops far short of this result. Instead, the
New Jersey doctrine provides for “reasonable access to the foreshore
as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.”219 This
standard is far from an indictment of the rights of private beachfront
landowners.
Furthermore, even if application of the Matthews factors to a
specific tract of privately owned beachfront land dictates that the
landowner must allow the public to access the dry sand area of the
tract, the landowner may, depending on the circumstances, still charge
“an appropriate fee structure for use of the beach by the public,” as
approved by the state DEP.220 Thus, the ability of private beachfront
landowners to charge fees for public beach access further illustrates
that the public’s right to access does not nearly extinguish the private
owner’s rights to his or her upland dry sand area.
Finally, the scope of a viable modern public trust doctrine must
encompass both modern activities and the significant modern demand
for access to the shoreline, neither of which were contemplated by
those who fashioned earlier iterations of the doctrine. Modern
demands on the seashore, which have increased as a result of societal
changes such as improvements in transportation and significant
population growth, have brought people to the shore in far greater
numbers than in the past.221 Counteracting this increase in demand is
an increase in the proportion of the shore that is privately owned,
leading to a strain on those areas of the shore that remain publicly
owned.222 The rights protected by the modern public trust doctrine
thus should not be “limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation
and fishing.”223 Instead, the doctrine should also encompass modern
recreational beach uses in order to ensure the flexibility of the
doctrine; modern uses that may not have been contemplated by
previous generations should be included in the modern doctrine, as
the New Jersey courts have recognized.224

219

Raleigh Ave., 879 A.2d at 121.
Id. at 124.
221
See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53
(N.J. 1972).
222
See id.
223
Id. at 54.
224
See id. at 54–55.
220
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V. CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine is an ancient doctrine, with its earliest
expression in ancient Rome and continued importance in the
common law of England many centuries later.225 The individual states
of the United States, in their adoption of the English common law,
assumed that the doctrine was a part of state common law—including
the doctrine’s stipulation of public ownership in tidal lands—after the
Revolution.226 The modern public trust doctrine establishes public
ownership of tidal lands either from the mean high tide line seaward,
as in New Jersey, Maryland, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island,
or from the mean low tide line seaward, as in Delaware and
Massachusetts. Additionally, each of the seven states discussed herein
offers the public at least some right to use the foreshore—the area of
sometimes-dry beach sand between the mean high tide line and the
mean low tide line—even in the two states recognizing privately owned
foreshores. Clearly, the public trust doctrine in each of these seven
states purports to protect at least some degree of the public’s right to
use the foreshore.
But public trust rights in the foreshore carry little clout, in
practice, without guarantees of access. Notably, six of the states
surveyed recognize neither a right incident to the public trust doctrine
of vertical access from upland areas to the foreshore, nor a right
incident to the doctrine of horizontal access above the foreshore to
any portion of the dry sand area immediately landward of the mean
high tide line. As a result of these deficiencies, the public trust
doctrine may be without substance outside of New Jersey, the only state
surveyed that guarantees at least some degree of vertical and
horizontal access. Though the public may own or have a right to use
the foreshore in each of the other six states, such ownership is of little
use if access by land remains impossible; in lieu of a right to vertical
access, there may be no way for the public to reach the foreshore, save
for by boat. Additionally, although the public supposedly has
expansive rights to use the foreshore in some of the six states, such
rights are of little use if the public is prohibited from using any of the
adjacent upland dry sand area while using the foreshore.
Thus, of the seven states surveyed in this Comment, only New
Jersey has guaranteed that the public trust doctrine is more than just a
225

Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 358–59
(Mass. 1979).
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See, e.g., Chapman v. Kimball, 9 Conn. 38 (Conn. 1831); Bickel v. Polk, 5 Del. (5
Harr.) 325 (Del. Super. Ct. 1851); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1821); Trustees of
Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E. 665 (N.Y. 1907); Allen v. Allen, 32 A. 166 (R.I. 1895).
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legal theory. Public ownership of the foreshore means something in
New Jersey; public trust rights give citizens the ability to actually reach
and to adequately use the foreshore. Unless changes occur in the
doctrines of the other six states, however, public trust rights to the
foreshore in those places may be of little or no value.

